There is a common view, dating back at least to Hume, that property rights presuppose scarcity. This paper is a critical examination of that thesis. In addition to questioning the thesis, the paper highlights the need to divorce the debate over this thesis from the debate over Intellectual Property (IP) rights (the area in which the thesis is most frequently applied). I begin by laying out the major line of defense for the thesis. In brief, the argument is that (1) property rights are legitimate only when necessary, (2) necessary only for the resolution of legitimate conflict over goods, and (3) that such conflict arises only where there is scarcity. While I accept (1), I argue that each of the three most prominent theories of the justification of property rights appeal to values for which property rights are likely necessary, even in the absence of scarcity. As it turns out, at the theoretical level, there are a number of different ways of dealing with this conflict. However, I argue, no matter which theoretical path one takes, it turns out that the practical implications of the relationship between property rights and scarcity have been woefully misconstrued. Finally, I discuss an independent argument which, though presented as an argument for the view in question, is in fact an objection only to IP. This serves to highlight the increasing importance of distinguishing the debate over IP from the debate over the relationship between property rights and scarcity.
Faraci 2 tracing back at least to the end of the 19th century.
2 Until recently, this view was primarily relevant only in debates about Intellectual Property (IP), for ideas were the only (arguably) non-scarce goods people claimed ownership in. Today, however, there are a number of other non-scarce goodsnotably digital media and software 3 -that people are likewise granted property rights in. What's more, speculations about future technologies-particularly those surrounding nanotechnology and the possibility of atomic/molecular manipulation-suggest that more and more goods that are currently scarce may no longer be in the future (e.g., essentially infinite amounts of food will be producible at infinitesimal cost in "matter compilers" or "replicators," to use a popular science fiction example). Because of these developments it is vital, now more than ever, that we clarify the relationship between scarcity and property rights, independently of specific concerns about the legitimacy of IP.
I begin, in §1, by laying out what I take to be the major line of defense for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. In brief, the argument is that (1) property rights are legitimate only when necessary, (2) necessary only for the resolution of legitimate conflict over goods, and (3) that such conflict arises only where there is scarcity. While I accept (1) (at least for the sake of argument), I argue in §2 that each of the three most prominent theories of the justification of property rights appeal to values for which property rights are likely necessary, even in the absence of scarcity. In §3, I consider what this implies for the thesis in question. As it turns out, at the theoretical level, there are a number of different ways one might deal with the apparent conflict 2 "The necessity which is recognize in all civilised societies of conferring rights of private or personal property arises from the limited supply of that for which there is an unlimited demand. It is only from a limitation of supply that there can be any value in exchange." Great Britain and Stephen, Copyright Commission, xlviii. 3 Of course, ownership of these is often protected through IP practices. But the manifestations of these goods are themselves arguably non-scarce, unlike in the case of, for example, (non-electronic) books.
Faraci 3 between the argument in §1 and the views discussed in §2. However, I argue that, no matter which theoretical path one takes, it turns out the practical implications of the relationship between property rights and scarcity have been woefully misconstrued. Finally, in §4, I recount an independent argument which, though presented as an argument for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity, is in fact an objection only to IP. My conclusion is twofold: First, it is highly unlikely that one can defend a relationship between property rights and scarcity that has the implications (e.g., against IP) it has typically been taken to have. Second, it is vital that we avoid conflating the debate over the relationship between property rights and scarcity with the debate over IP.
Before embarking, a brief word concerning the nature of property rights. As mentioned above, arguments for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity have primarily been deployed to object to specific property rights practices, such as copyright and patent law in the United States. Given this, I wish to remain as neutral as possible regarding the theoretical nature of property. Indeed, "property" is not really at stake here. What matters is the justification for granting particular sorts of exclusive rights over goods. My target is the claim that, without scarcity, the granting of such rights is unjustified.
With that in mind, let us proceed with a modified version of A.M. Honore's widely endorsed conception of property as a "bundle of rights." On Honore's account, this bundle consists of 12 "sticks" or "incidents": rights to (1) possess, (2) use, (3) manage, (4) and receive income; the power to (5) transfer, (6) waive, (7) exclude and (8) abandon; the liberties to (9) consume or destroy; (10) immunity from expropriation; (11) the duty not to use property harmfully; and (12) liability for execution to satisfy a court ordered judgment. Faraci 4
To say that P owns x is, on this analysis, to say that P has an adequate number of the incidents Since it is far beyond the scope of this paper to resolve these matters, let us move forward on the assumption that, schematically, systems of property rights will mimic, though perhaps not precisely match, Honore's-they will grant a bundle of exclusive rights (liberties, obligations, etc.), or some part thereof, including some of those listed above, to individuals or groups of individuals, with respect to particular goods. This should serve as a sufficiently generic account of property rights to encompass all schemes that are intuitively recognizable as property rights practices, without being so indeterminate as to fail to provide a genuine target.
In Defense of the Thesis that Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity
For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has already more than Faraci 6 "unlimited" not in the literal sense of being infinite in quantity, but in the sense that I can possess the relevant good regardless of who else does.
For the purposes of the arguments to come (though I revisit this issue in §3), I will thus understand a good's being scarce to be synonymous with its being rivalrous, with one qualification.
Note that while we have been discussing air as a non-rivalrous good, oxygen molecules are rivalrous-my possession (breathing) of them interferes with yours. Thus, when we discuss rivalry in the context of scarcity, we must be clear that we are talking about good types rather than good tokens.
Particular oxygen molecules are rivalrous, true, but oxygen generally speaking is not, because (again, in most circumstances) there is sufficient oxygen readily available that one person's breathing oxygen does not interfere with anyone else's doing the same.
With that in hand, we can give a fuller characterization of the argument for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. First, Hume seems to be appealing to an implicit premise that property rights are in serious need of justification. In and of itself, I think this should be fairly uncontroversial. As Hume's opening questions suggest, it is indeed hard to see why we would grant persons exclusive rights in goods unless there were some serious reason for doing so-some situation which necessitated our making "a partition of goods." Surely, the burden of justification falls on those who propose such a partition, not those who would challenge it. Thus, we are asked to accept:
P1
Property rights are legitimate only insofar as they are necessary.
This leads naturally to the question of when property rights are necessary. others. And this, the idea seems to be, happens only in cases where the good in question is scarce.
Thus, Hume seems to suggest that we should accept:
P2
Property rights are necessary only for the resolution of legitimate conflict.
P3
There can be legitimate conflict over goods of type G only if goods of type G are scarce.
Together, P1-P3 entail that property rights are legitimate only for scarce goods. This argument seems to be what many-certainly, I think, Hume-have had in mind in defending the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity.
9
Of course, this is not the only argument one might offer for this conclusion. For example, one might hold that the relationship between property rights and scarcity is just part of the meaning of "property." Indeed, some seem to follow this suggestion. In preparation for examining P2 and P3, note that the argument above seeks to establish that scarcity is necessary for the legitimization of property rights, not that it is sufficient to justify any particular system of property rights. Indeed, there may well be values beyond conflict-resolution that tell us what particular property rights we should have.
Suppose we are building a system of property rights from the ground up. We start with the premise that property rights are legitimized, at root, by their being necessary for resolution of conflicts over scarce goods. We therefore set out to develop a system of property rights that will resolve such conflicts. One way to resolve conflicts would be to just give everything to Bob. But this would apparently be unfair. 13 And, arguably, fairness is a value that we should respect in attempting to resolve conflicts. Thus, we might institute a different system, perhaps one in which everyone gets an equal share of whatever there is. This system may or may not be optimal with respect to other important values. If it is, then it may turn out to be the most just system-i.e., the system that, on balance, responds most appropriately to all relevant values, including conflict-resolution, fairness, and whatever else is determined to be relevant.
It is important to notice, however, that an appeal to further values, such as fairness, does not necessarily undermine the claim that the need for conflict-resolution is the root justification for property rights. The reason, quite simply, is that (on this view) property rights respect the value of fairness only insofar as they are necessary for conflict-resolution. What we are respecting, really, is 13 Additionally, as Peter Jaworski pointed out to me, we might hope that whatever system we develop for resolving conflicts would be one that all involved could rationally endorse. Without that, it seems less likely that the system in question will succeed at resolving conflict, since others may feel warranted in continuing to fight Bob for various goods. However, fairness still must be doing some work here, as we would balk at this system if it were sure to resolve conflict-e.g., if Bob was sufficiently powerful that others would see conflict with him as too costly to pursue.
fairness in how we resolve conflicts. If there were no need for conflict-resolution, there would arguendo be no need for distribution of goods and, therefore, no need for fair distribution of goods.
With this in mind, it is not hard to see what we should say about P2 and P3: These premises are true only if there is no value such that property rights are necessary for respecting that value even in the absence of conflict and/or scarcity. Demonstrating that there is such a value is beyond the scope of this paper. My goal is not to prove conclusively that property rights are necessary for respecting some particular value in the absence of legitimate conflict or of scarcity, but merely to show that this possibility has not been satisfactorily undermined. This is not a hard challenge to meet.
To begin with, it is important to notice that nothing has been said thus far to undermine the possibility of the existence of such a value. Indeed, from what I can tell, little to nothing of substance has ever been offered for the claim that there is no such value. As we see in Hume, defense of the relationship between property rights and scarcity typically falls to generalizing from our intuitions about why we have property rights at all, generalizing from certain apparently representative examples-e.g., our intuition that one cannot have a legitimate claim over goods like air and water.
Indeed, I do not deny that this is highly intuitive. It is quite difficult to see any reason why one person should be able to lay claim to these goods over another. What's more, it is easy to understand the temptation to explain this with an appeal to scarcity. After all, if water and air were scarce, we might well grant property rights in them. Nevertheless, we cannot simply take it on faith that generalizing from these examples is appropriate. From the fact that we see no reason to grant property rights in certain non-scarce goods, it simply does not follow that there is no reason to do so elsewhere. Indeed, what is particularly striking is that not only has very little been said about why there could be no independent value that would provide such reasons, but, as I discuss in the next Faraci 10 section, the most prominent views on the justification of property rights explicitly appeal to such values.
Three Prominent Views on the Basis of Property Rights
In this section, I examine three prominent views on the basis of property rights and argue that property rights are necessary for respecting the values appealed to by each, even in (at least some) circumstances where goods are not scarce. The purpose of this section is not to defend any of these views on the basis of property rights. Rather, it is to show that the views, which each have both advantages and disadvantages, but which continue to be supported by various theorists, offer no support for a relationship between property rights and scarcity. property rights. On models like this, property rights are justified because they further some important (social) end (e.g., here, progress).
14 Again, the issue here is the relationship between property rights and scarcity in general, not the specific issue of the justification of IP. For an overview of the problems with each view as it relates to IP, as well as a proposal for a "pluralistic" account incorporating all three, see Resnik, "A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual
Property."
15 "The Constitution of the United States," Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.
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Even without this case where conequentialist reasoning is explicitly used to extend property rights to non-scarce goods, it should be clear that nothing about the consequentialist viewpoint per se should lead us to think that property presupposes scarcity. Of course, one could have a consequentialist view on which it does; for example, one could have the view that property rights are justified because they have the consequence of avoiding conflict over scarce goods. But on many other views-such as that underpinning the US's policy above-this would not be the case.
Returning to the argument in the last section: If property rights presuppose scarcity, it should be that whatever consequentialist values property rights are necessary to respect, they are so only in the face of scarcity. But this may well not be the case. Indeed, the extension of consequentialist reasoning to IP serves only to bolster this claim. Clearly, people think that the value of innovation is furthered in the absence of scarcity if this value is explicitly appealed to in order to justify property rights in non-scarce ideas! Assuming there are no better ways of respecting this value, it could well be necessary to grant property rights in non-scarce goods after all.
Hegelian Theories
Both Hegel himself and a number of theorists following him have argued that property rights are based in a kind of self-expression:
A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea.
. . . The rationale of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the Very briefly: Locke begins from the premise that we own ourselves. Because I own myself, I
own my labor, which is a part of me. When I mix my labor with some good, I come to own that 18 See, e.g., Resnik, "A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property," 326-327.
19 "scarcity" in question will not be what Hume and others had in mind, since it will in no way be linked to abundance. 20 For discussion of arguments for and against Lockean IP, see Tavani Once again, the question is whether property rights are necessary for respecting the values Locke references, even in the absence of scarcity. It might well be that without scarcity the provisos would never be violated, since one arguably cannot waste nor fail to leave "enough and as good" of something that is non-scarce. If so, the question is simply whether property rights in non-scarce goods are ever necessary for respecting self-ownership or ownership of one's labor. It is hard to see why scarcity should make any difference here. If I come to own some good by mixing my labor with it, it seems utterly irrelevant how many of that good exists, whether my use of that good interferes with yours, or whether I can prevent you from enjoying my good. Thus, scarcity seems utterly irrelevant to the grounding of Lockean property rights.
Implications: Theory and Practice
Each of the theories discussed in the previous section appeals to values for which property rights may well be necessary, irrespective of how freely available goods are. One might think the implication clear: Insofar as one of these views is correct-or at least, insofar as one ought to countenance that possibility-the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity is either false or, at least, seriously under-motivated.
It must be admitted, however, that at the theoretical level, things are not quite so simple.
First, even if one accepts this conclusion, it is important to note that the precise implications for the argument presented in §1 have not been settled. Lockeans should reject P3! Either way, the argument presented in §1 is unsound.
Unfortunately, things are not even this simple. For another way to respond to the apparent tension between the argument in §1 and the views in §2 is to claim, not that property rights do not presuppose scarcity, but that I have misunderstood the nature of scarcity itself. Here is one example of how this might go: Take the Hegelian view discussed in §2.2, according to which property rights help us to respect the value of self-expression. One might argue that in addition to being rendered scarce when my possession of them precludes your possession of them, goods are rendered scarce when my possession of them undermines their expressive power for you. In that case, it might yet turn out that property rights do presuppose scarcity; it's just that many more things than we've typically thought turn out to be scarce! Once again, I will not attempt to settle the theoretical issue here. This is not because it is not important, but because, ultimately, it does not affect the goals of this paper. What matters is that, regardless of the correct understanding of scarcity, proponents, like Hume, have clearly relied on a conception of scarcity that entails something like rivalrousness or lack of abundance. And it is this that the values discussed in §2 call into question. To take the obvious example, the "Hegelian" At the end of the day, then, it doesn't particularly matter whether we give up the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity or just rethink what scarcity is. Either way, the conclusion remains: The arguments that have been offered for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity fail to motivate the idea that a good's unlimited availability makes it unjust for us to grant persons exclusive rights over it.
Emerging Technologies and Non-Scarce Property: Beyond IP
Thus ends my critique of the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. Before concluding, however, one further issue: As mentioned earlier, there might be arguments other than the one presented in §1 for embracing the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity (rivalrousness). In this section, I consider an argument that has been presented as such. I contend that this is in fact an argument against IP specifically, not against ownership of non-scarce goods. Since it is presented explicitly as the latter, this discussion serves to further highlight the need to distinguish the debate over the relationship between property rights and scarcity from the specific debate over IP: 24 An anonymous reviewer suggested to me some ways of resisting this objection, even in the case of patents.
For the sake of argument, however, I will assume that Kinsella is right that there is a legitimate concern here, since my main point, discussed below, is that this objection-however weak or strong it may be-is not really an objection to ownership of scarce goods, but only to IP.
cost ad infinitum. This would make hamburgers (at least of the sort made by this machine) nonscarce; your having a hamburger would in no way interfere with my doing the same. Suppose, though, that I were granted sole ownership of the machine and its issue. Here I am with my infinite pile of hamburgers and there you are going about business as usual. It is hard to see how this would in any way diminish your property rights in anything you own. 25 Indeed, claiming that this situation affects your property rights in any way seems like a total non sequitor.
The upshot is that Kinsella's objection, even insofar as it is successful against IP, offers no reason whatsoever to embrace the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. The fact that he takes it to do so is a further indication of the frequency and ease with which theorists have conflated the issues of the justification of IP, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of property rights in nonscarce goods, on the other. This conflation is understandable given the aforementioned fact that, until recently, IP was the only instance of property rights being granted in non-scarce goods. But recent and prospective technological advances have changed all that, and it is a change we must be careful to acknowledge. Being careful to differentiate the general issue of property rights and scarcity from the justification of IP is an important first step.
Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper has been to argue that, whether or not we ultimately decide to retain some version of the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity, we have little reason to think that it can be deployed as its proponents have typically thought. Insofar as we recognize values 25 In fact, ironically, it may be that what would affect someone's property rights would be the thesis that one cannot own non-scarce goods. Suppose that Ted owns a hamburger shop where he makes hamburgers just like the ones my machine produces. If property rights presuppose scarcity, then, arguably, once I make my machine, Ted would cease to own the hamburgers he produces! Faraci 18 like those discussed in §2, we may well find justification for granting persons exclusive rights in infinitely abundant goods. Given the increasing importance of IP, and the growing likelihood that certain tangible goods will become (nearly) infinitely abundant, recognizing this is important, now more than ever.
